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a b s t r a c t
The paper presents a topological risk mapping for aircraft overruns. The proposed procedure is based on
the study published in 2008 by Hall et al. (Analysis of aircraft overruns and undershoots for runway
safety areas. Airport Cooperative Research Program. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board;
2008). In that study the authors performed an analysis of aircraft overruns and undershoots for runway
safety areas proposing the ACRP hazard probability model. In the present study the model was
integrated into a two-step Monte Carlo simulation procedure to assess the risk of overrun accidents
and to provide a topological risk map for a specific airport area. The model was modified to utilize traffic-
related and weather-related factors described by statistical distributions of historical data of the airport
under analysis. The probability distribution of overrun events was then combined with the Longitudinal
and Lateral Location models Hall et al. (Analysis of aircraft overruns and undershoots for runway safety
areas. Airport Cooperative Research Program. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board; 2008) to
obtain a two-dimensional grid assessing the probability of each area to be the end point of a runway
overrun. The expected kinetic energy of the aircraft in a given point of the grid is used as severity index.
The procedure is suitable for generalisation and it allows a more detailed planning of Airport Safety
Areas (ASA), improving the correct implementation of ICAO recommendations. Results are also useful for
land planning and structural analyses in airport areas.
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Operations in the airport field are subjected to a number of
different risks, both due to human action and to the intrinsic nature
of the manoeuvres themselves. These events may have various
characteristics and cover a wide range of events such as collisions
between aircraft travelling on taxiways, terrorist strikes, bird strikes,
undershoots and many others. This study focuses on runway related
accidents and in particular on landing and takeoff overruns. Runway-
related accidents represent a relevant fraction of the total number of
recorded accidents leading to substantial damage: according to an
investigation carried out by the Flight Safety Foundation and based
on a data pool collected worldwide from1995 to 2008, 30% of the
total number of accidents belong to the “runway related” category
[2]. In particular, 97% of these are overruns. A runway overrun is an
event where the aircraft running off the end or the side of the
runway exceeding the runway limits during flight operation. This
case can happen in three possible scenarios: landing overrun, takeoff
overrun and landing undershoot. While undershoots affect the
approach and landing phases of the flight, when it may happen that
the aircraft touches the ground in a point before the beginning of the
runway, overrun events may happen either during landing or during
takeoff operations if the aircraft fails to come to a stop within the
runway boundaries. Scenarios are reported in the statistical sum-
mary of commercial jet airline accidents for worldwide operations
from 1959 to 2013 compiled by Boeing [3], a further analysis of 35
years of landing overrun accidents is discussed in the report
compiled by Van Es [4]. Along those lines useful information is also
to be found in a detailed analysis of an aircraft accident model for
Taiwan performed by Shao et al. in 2009 [5]. The scenarios selected
for the present study considering also the high number of observed
occurrences, are those in which the aircraft departs from the runway
following a longitudinal direction, therefore crossing its end [6].
Thanks to safety management practices it is possible to locate
and estimate risks related to the different accident events, evaluate
potential countermeasures and consequently plan the best alloca-
tion of resources to reduce risk while maximizing productivity. In
particular, the International Civil Aviation Organization [7] issued
regulations and procedures for the installation of structures with
the aim of preventing and mitigating consequences of such events:
despite containing useful guidelines for aerodrome design, they
still lack the necessary topological contextualisation and thus may
result in very different safety levels depending on the aerodrome
characteristics. This leads to the need for a procedure able to
evaluate the risk associated with overrun accidents, taking into
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account the specific characteristics of the airport under analysis, in
terms of layout and operations, with the aim of identifying specific
local critical situations.
The objective of the study is to develop and test a probabilistic
model able to topologically characterize the risk of aircraft over-
runs in airports taking into consideration a wide set of uncertain
factors, both traffic related and weather related. Starting from
existing accident probability models, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis
(PRA) procedure is proposed for the assessment of the risk level for
infrastructure, buildings and generally obstacles surrounding the
airport area, through the definition of a risk map to be super-
imposed on the airport layout. This will be useful for the identi-
fication of the most critical locations and infrastructure in the area,
and subsequently for the definition of effective risk mitigation
strategies and emergency plans.
The paper starts from a preliminary study already published in
[8] and extends the theoretical and methodological background as
well as the analysis of results. The paper is organised as follows: in
the next section the overall proposed probabilistic approach to
runway excursion risk analysis is described and justified in relation
to existing contributions in the scientific literature. Section 3 pro-
vides an overview of the state of the art on aircraft overrun
probability models and describes the selected reference model
adopted in the proposed PRA procedure. Section 4 describes the
reference deceleration model, while Section 5 is devoted to the
detailed description of the proposed two-step PRA procedure able
to return a topological risk mapping of the airport layout. Section
6 describes the consequence model by introducing the concept of
Iso-Kinetic Energy Areas (KEA) as the main severity index. Finally,
Section 7 reports the test case application, whereas conclusions
and further research opportunities are drawn in Section 8.
2. A probabilistic approach to runway overrun risk analysis
While the risk of an aircraft overrunning a runway depends on
many factors, like for instance the aircraft weight, weather condi-
tions, presence of contamination on runway surface and many
others, in safety regulations and airport operations it is very hard
to keep track of all these contributions. Only very generic indexes
are widely considered: ICAO recommendations in Annex 14 give
very broad directions, in which the aircraft reference field length is
the only discriminating variable [7].
Indeed, the problem of developing a customized and consistent
risk evaluation methodology on which safety management actions
can be based is therefore not a new topic; current models [1] often
take a number of factors into consideration to estimate the
probability of a certain operation to end up in an overrun incident.
In a study published in 2008 by Hall, Wong, & Ayres titled ACRP
(Airport Cooperative Research Program) the authors performed an
analysis of aircraft overruns and undershoots for runway safety areas
[1]. An accident probability model was then used in combinationwith
a location model, which in turn gives a cumulative probability
distribution of the overrunning aircraft to end up its run at a certain
distance from the runway end; through the use of both of these
models it is possible to assign a probability and a severity value to
every considered operation, but it is not possible to characterize the
entire airport. This method is very useful when one wants to rank a
set of operations by their risk coefficients, which allows to spot
critical ones and help deciding where intervention is needed and
where resources should be concentrated.
The method discussed in this paper is based on the ACRP model.
Unlike former models the ACRP hazard probability model [1] uses
normal operational data along with accident data: this allows
quantifying the importance of every factor and the way it influ-
ences the final accident probability. The model is reported in the
form of a logistic regression, and takes into account many different
factors both from the traffic and weather conditions point of view,
for a total of fourteen and eleven regression parameters for landing
and takeoff overruns, respectively. The logistic regression techni-
que was chosen because it was deemed suitable to model phe-
nomena with a dichotomous outcome like incident or non-
incident, and to take into account a high number of variables
including a mixture of continuous and categorical parameters. This
kind of approach does not only take into account the particular
conditions of one single operation, but allows to describe in a
statistical way the traffic and weather conditions a particular
runway undergoes throughout the year, thus making possible to
obtain a more general result which is valid for all operations
carried out on the runway in a specific time window.
Once a “portrait” of the considered runway is obtained, which is
independent from any of its particular operations, it is possible to
associate it with a distribution, which points out the probability of
having a takeoff or landing overrun for that runway. Furthermore,
by integrating the location model it is also possible to characterize
each point beyond the runway end with the probability distribu-
tion of the aircraft kinetic energy, measuring the intensity of the
potential impact with an obstacle located in the same point of
the grid.
The final step of the proposed methodology is to match these
two results – overrun probability and kinetic energy probability for
each point of the grid – to assign every point of the terrain
surrounding the runway a probability distribution of the expected
aircraft kinetic energy for a single movement; since kinetic energy
is an index of the damage occurring to possible obstacles in case of
crash, the final result is a risk grid around the airport, which can be
superimposed on a map of the airport area in order to assign each
building a risk value. This is particularly useful in the case of
airports close to large and critical infrastructure, generally lacking
space for increasing safety areas.
3. Overrun probability models
3.1. Literature review and selection of reference models
In order to assess risk values, tools were needed to assign
probability values associated with overrun accidents, as well as
models able to estimate consequences of such events. A literature
review revealed that several accident probability models have been
published in the last decade, starting from Eddowes and Handcox
[9], in a report produced by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority
concerning risk analysis in support of aerodrome design rules. I
was followed by Kirkland et al. [10] with studies on data collection
and normalization that led to development of models allowing the
estimation of probability, location of wreckage and an assessment
of the consequences. The models performance was measured with
Hosmer–Lemeshow coefficients: for landing models, when using
excess distance available as input, it accounts for 11% of the
determinants of overrun. If fed with weight-related data the model
explains 2.4% and 4.8% of landing and takeoff overrun occurrences,
respectively. These models had a major limitation as data was only
collected for overrun accidents and not for normal operation data
(due to the lack of availability of the latter): this led to the
impossibility to demonstrate that possible influencing variables
have higher frequency in correspondence to incidents than in
correspondence of non overrunning flights.
In 2008 the ACRP report “Analysis of Aircraft Overruns and
Undershoots for Runway Safety Areas” was published [1]: it faced
the problem of assessing overrun probability values for landing and
takeoff operations in a more accurate way, accounting for several
causal factors and using a model based on a large database of
P. Trucco et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 142 (2015) 433–443434
normal operations and accident data. In 2009 Wong et al. proposed
a further development of the model. They added a frequency
model based on specific accident types in addition to the building
of a single comprehensive database of all relevant accident types.
They also tried to consider where in relation to the runway these
accidents are likely to occur, but it was mainly based on cumulative
previous accident frequencies for different scenarios without
actually modelling kinetic energy during landing or take off, i.e.
knowing the frequency of accident occurrence are of limited use,
and their conclusions are less general, as they used only data
collected in the United States [11]. A more detailed description of
the ACRP model used is offered in Section 3.2.
In Table 1 the main characteristics of the most important overrun
accident probability models reported in the literature are briefly
summarised. Based on a literature review of prior models, we decided
to employ the ACRP hazard probability model. It was preferred to the
others mainly due to the large amount of data upon which it is built,
coming from civil aviation operations in countries having accident
rates comparable to the U.S. In contrast with former models it shows a
great improvement by using normal operation data: this allows
quantifying the importance of every factor and the way it influences
the final accident probability. The model is a logistic regression, and it
takes into account many different factors both from the point of view
of traffic characterization and exposition of the runway to weather
conditions, for a total of fourteen and eleven regression parameters for
landing and takeoff overrun respectively; none of the previous models
were able to consider all these variables, thus allowing such a
complete and deep characterization of the site object of the study.
The drawback of such a strong dependence upon data records able to
describe the considered circumstance is that some important factors
that are part of the actual outcomes of the events could not be
considered (e.g. the actual nature of obstacles on the runway path and
their impact on reducing the kinetic energy of the aircraft).
3.2. The ACRP model
The ACRP model was developed by Hall et al. [1] and was
obtained through logistic regression. The model was built using a
large number of Normal Operation Data (NOD), which was a great
improvement with respect to older models such as the ones used
in the studies of Norwegian Civil Aviation in 2001 [9], which only
considered accident data. Thanks to the use of NOD, the number of
operations that experienced a particular factor with a benign
outcome can be compared to the number of operations where
that same factor led to an accident, and therefore the risk factor can
be quantified. This allows the understanding of cause-result
relationships in takeoff and landing accidents; trends in influential
factors can be used to estimate trends in risk levels.
None of the previous models were able to consider all these
variables, thus allowing such a complete and deep characterization
of the site object of the study. The drawback of such a strong
dependence upon data records is that for some important factors
consistent data are lacking. Indeed, there is no international
standard agreement on the reporting of normal operations or even
incidents information. The ACRP model is composed of three
modules: Accident Probability model, Longitudinal Location model
and Lateral Location Model.
3.2.1. Accident probability model
The accident probability model is used to examine accident and
incident probability associated with a number of factors, selected
by the authors from a mix of weather related and traffic related
conditions. The model has the form:
PðAccident occurrenceÞ ¼ 1
1þeb0 þb1X1 þb2X2 þ⋯ ¼
1
1þeb ð1Þ
where P(Accident occurrence) is the probability of occurrence of
the considered accident type (landing overrun or takeoff overrun),
and coefficient b is determined by the regression analysis including
a set of independent variable ðXiÞ. Thus the model is controlled by
the sole parameter b, which is a factor used to characterize the type
of overrun which depends on the fact that the overrun may have
occurred in take off, or landing and considering other factors (e.g.
type of aircraft, visibility etc.). The values it can assume are
reported in Table 2.
3.2.2. Longitudinal location model
The Location model was developed by Eddowes and Hancox [9]
and has the same structure for both landing and takeoff overruns:
PðLocation4xÞ ¼ e axnð Þ ð2Þ
where a and n are coefficients depending on the accident type and
x is the longitudinal coordinate with origin at the end of the
runway and belonging to an axis parallel to the runway centre line.
The model returns the probability of the aircraft to end its run
beyond the location point addressed by the x coordinate (Fig. 1).
Table 1
Comparison of overrun accident models reported in literature.
Eddowes et al. [9] Kirkland et al. [10] Hall et al. [1,6] Wong et al. [11]
Number of factors included in the model 1 o5 14 17
Type of input and output data. (D¼deterministic; P¼probabilistic) D D D D
Is the model based on a collection of international data (incident reports and/or NOD)? No No Yes No
Is the model based on Normal Operations Data (NOD)? No No Yes Yes
Table 2
Factors used to characterize b in Eq. (1) for each accident type.
Factors to be added to b to
characterize the type of takeoff
overrun
Factors to be added to b to
characterize the type of landing
overrun
b(Takeoff Overrun)¼16.6515 b(Landing Overrun)¼15.456þ
þ0.721(Heavy aircraft) þ0.551(Heavy aircraft)
0.619(Commuter Aircraft) 2.113(Commuter Aircraft)
0.009(Medium Aircraft) 1.064(Medium Aircraft)
þ1.669(Small Aircraft) 0.876(Small Aircraft)
þ1.052(General Aviation) þ0.445(Turboprop Aircraft)
þ1.225(Ceiling Height o1000 ft) 0.856(Foreign Origin)
þ1.497(Ceiling Height 1001–1500 ft) þ1.832(Ceiling Height o1000 ft)
þ0.201(Visibility o2 SM) þ1.639(Ceiling Height 1001–1500 ft)
1.941(Visibility 2–4 SM) þ2.428(Visibility o2 SM)
0.366(Visibility 4–6 SM) þ1.186(Visibility 2–4 SM)
þ0.317(Visibility 6–8 SM) þ1.741(Visibility 4–6 SM)
þ1.660(Fog) þ0.322(Visibility 6–8 SM)
0.292(Crosswind 2–5 kt) 0.532(Crosswind 2–5 kt)
þ1.598(Crosswind 5–12 kt) þ1.566(Crosswind 5–12 kt)
þ1.781(Crosswind 412 kt) þ0.986(Electrical Storm)
0.536(Temperature o5 1C) þ1.926(Icing Conditions)
0.507(Temperature 5–15 1C) þ1.499(Snow)
þ0.502(Temperature 425 1C) 1.009(Temperature o5 1C)
þ1.805(Icing Conditions) 0.631(Temperature 5–15 1C)
þ2.567(Snow) þ0.265(Temperature 425 1C)
0.619(Commuter Aircraft) þ1.006(Non Hub Airport)
0.009(Medium Aircraft) þ0.924(Significant Terrain)
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Fig. 2 shows the values for Landing and Takeoff overrun location
probabilities. The graphs refer to raw distances.
3.2.3. Lateral location model
Besides longitudinal runway excursions, during overrun accidents
there is the possibility that the aircraft departs from the lateral
boundary of the runway. In a very similar way to the previously
illustrated longitudinal model, the lateral location model gives the
probability of the plane’s final position after an overrun. Fig. 3 gives a
graphical representation of the cumulative probability for landing
and takeoff events, respectively.
According to these models, landing overruns final lateral posi-
tion is characterized by a distribution with a smaller variance than
in the case of takeoff overruns.
4. The deceleration model and the initial speed value
The deceleration model used in this study is introduced in ACRP
report 3 [1] as a tool for data normalization; it was developed by
Kirkland et al. [10]. It is based on a linear regression and has the
following form:
a¼ pþqnu ð3Þ
where a is the acceleration in [m/s2], p is a parameter derived from
the regression which accounts for different terrain types according to
values shown in Table 3 and u is the initial speed (i.e. runway exit
speed) in [m/s]. The values currently assigned to this parameter
could be extended to take into account obstacles with different
frangibility levels, however those values were not considered in the
current methodology where the focus was testing the advantages
provided by a special application of the kinetic energy theorem as
illustrated further in this paragraph. Parameter q [ms] is constant
across all the cases. The parameter accounting for the ground type
gathers together respectively wet grass with dry grass and pavement,
mud and gravel and obstacles and water. Using this model we are
Fig. 1. Reference scheme for the FAA ACRP longitudinal and lateral models [6].
RSA¼runway safety area.
Fig. 2. Longitudinal location model for landing and takeoff overruns [1].
Fig. 3. Lateral location model for landing and takeoff overruns (LDOR: landing overruns; TOOR: take-off overruns) [1].
Table 3
Values of deceleration model parameter p depend-
ing on terrain type [10].
Ground type p
Wet grass/dry grass/pavement 0.0185
Mud/gravel 2.8065
Obstacles/water 8.5365
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therefore able to discriminate only between very generic ground
types, which in turn embrace a wide range of possible conditions.
The above-mentioned equation is used along with eq. (4), an
application of the kinetic energy theorem, which allows the
calculation of an average acceleration value given travelled dis-
tance and extreme speed values.
a¼ V
2u2
2s
ð4Þ
where a is the acceleration, V the final velocity, u the initial velocity
ad s the distance traveled.
The coupling of these two equations allows solving for the
initial speed, which is the only unknown term since we assume the
final speed to be null in correspondence of the final location (as
assumed by the location model) and we keep the traveled distance
as an independent parameter (Eq. (5)).
u¼ qsþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðqsÞ22ps
q
ð5Þ
We are therefore able to associate an initial speed to any possible
value of distance covered by the plane before stopping, which means
we can also assign a speed to each point along its route given its final
location. This relationship is linear.
5. Topological modelling of the overrun accident probability
The objective of the study was to obtain a probability distribu-
tion able to describe the accident probability for the whole landing
and takeoff traffic of the chosen runway for the all relevant
operation conditions.
Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the two-step procedure that uses the
Monte Carlo method in order to properly account for the uncer-
tainties in causal factors. The frequency model was therefore fed
with discrete probability distribution functions, one for each one of
the factors included in the ACRP model. Parameter b was modified
in such a way that it could be governed by discrete probability
distributions. Eq. (6) shows the basic expression, where Xij is the
ith level of the jth factor and can only assume values one, if the
considered operation was carried out in the particular condition
represented by that level, or zero, in all other cases. Eq. (5) shows
how the expression of parameter b has been modified. Moreover, it
would have been necessary to assess a correlation between values
belonging to the same category, since the same record cannot fall
into two different levels of the same category at the same time.
b¼ a0þa1X11þa2X21þa3X31þ⋯þanXnm ð6Þ
b¼ a0þ½discretedistributionða1; p1; a2;p2; a3; p3;…Þ
þ⋯þ½discretedistributionð…; an2; pn2; an1; pn1; an; pnÞ
ð7Þ
In Eq. (7) each factor is described by one discrete distribution,
which couples each level iwith its probability of occurrence pi; it was
therefore sufficient for every level to record its frequency of occur-
rence within the factor, and use the information to build a discrete
probability distribution with these values; this has to be done for
every factor; finally, distributions obtained are fed into the model. A
graphical representation is given in Fig. 6 of the distribution for factor
“visibility”; it consists in four levels, labeled from one to four. The
software chosen to run these calculations was Palisade @Risk.
Therefore, it is possible to build a two-dimensional grid that
reports the probability of every point to be hit by an accident. Once
again, this is done using Monte Carlo simulations: the value we are
looking for is the combination of the three different abovemen-
tioned probabilities. In order for the point to be hit by an accident,
first the accident has to happen, second the plane has to exit the
runway fast enough to reach the considered point and finally the
crash point has to fall into the lateral range corresponding to the
considered location.
Fig. 4. Block diagram of the first part of the procedure, returning the topological grid of overrun location probability (expressed as event/movement).
Fig. 5. Block diagram of the second part of the procedure returning the topological grid of the expected kinetic energy distribution (KEA, expressed in kJ/movement).
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The combined probability is therefore the product of these
three probabilities, two of which are single values while one is
described by a probability density function. The cells of the grid, of
arbitrary size, correspond to physical areas, which correspond to
the estimated probability of such areas being hit by an overrun
accident (Fig. 4).
6. Severity index and Iso-Kinetic Energy Areas (KEA)
In order to evaluate the consequences of an overrun accident,
along with possible casualties and harm to passengers and crew-
members, also direct and indirect costs should be taken into
account. Indirect costs, such as loss of revenue, loss of operating
time, disruption of flight schedule and reputational loss, are
estimated to be four times the amount of direct costs [9] in this
type of accident; they are very hard to evaluate, since they depend
upon many factors not directly connected with the dynamics of the
accident. Direct costs comprise injuries, damage to the aircraft,
investigations and third party injuries; while they are not alto-
gether easy to evaluate, their connection with accident dynamics is
more intuitive and they also give a good idea about the overall
severity of the event.
It is however impossible to make a pinpoint forecast of
casualties and direct costs; we therefore focused on property loss,
which comprises damage to the aircraft and damage to infrastruc-
ture potentially involved in the accident. As common sense
suggests, these two elements in the large majority of cases are
dependent from the intensity of the impact: this in turn can be
quantified by the evaluation of either forces involved or the energy
values. To this end, state-of-art approaches involve complex
dynamic analysis with three-dimensional finite elements [12–18]
these approaches require the definition of shapes and materials,
and results are not fit for generalization.
As our objective was to characterize every possible critical target
in the surroundings of the runway with a risk value, it was not
practical to undertake such a detailed and refined work for all the
infrastructure present in the area. The solution was to substitute cost
as a severity parameter with the kinetic energy of the aircraft in the
crash. This approach uncouples incident dynamics and target char-
acterization; it is therefore not meant to be quantitative in terms of
damage assessment, either from a physical or economical point of
view, while it is able to return a criticality index and associated
information for a possible detailed local study.
Using the deceleration model, the cumulative probability func-
tion of accident location, given by the Location Model, was turned
into a cumulative probability function for speed for every location
chosen beyond the runway end. We chose these locations so they
would match with columns of the two-dimensional grid previously
defined, in order to be able to superimpose results later on.
Using the aforementioned described formula the cumulative
probability function of accident location, given by the Location
Model, was turned into a cumulative probability function for
speed. This was easily done by associating each distance with its
corresponding initial speed: for instance if we place ourselves on
the runway end in x¼0, we will have a probability equal to 1 for
the speed to be greater than zero, given the overrun occurrence;
the Location model then gives for example a probability value of
0.1 that the aircraft will travel a distance of 245 m or beyond;
according to the deceleration model, the airplane has to exit the
runway with a speed of at least 120 km per hour in order to reach
that distance. We can therefore assert that there is a probability of
0.1 that during a landing overrun accident the aircraft has a speed
equal or superior to 120 km/h.
The reasoning is repeated for all the points and a cumulative
probability function is drawn, which is then converted into a
probability distribution function. The result is only an approxima-
tion since the cumulative probability function previously obtained
is known only by points and not by the algebraic formula; the
derivative is therefore replaced with a finite incremental ratio. This
however should not jeopardize the validity of results since the
resolution is pretty high, there being one calculated value every
5 m in a context where interesting distances are of the order of
hundreds of meters.
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The procedure is then repeated, moving the observation point
to every other distance of interest along the runway axis, with a
slight difference: in x-points greater than zero there is not a 100%
probability of the aircraft reaching the observation point: the
resulting speed distribution is then characterized by a very high
probability corresponding to the zero value. For instance, in
x¼50 m we have a probability of 0.625 to record a zero speed,
while the remaining 0.375 is spread between all the possible non-
zero speed values. This high delta obviously increases as the
observation point is located farther from the runway end and the
probability of recording a null velocity in case of accident increases
accordingly, with the effect of making graphical results very
difficult to understand.
In order to solve this problem the speed distribution is calcu-
lated by excluding the null value, while this information is kept
separated and represents the probability that, even in case of an
accident, the aircraft does not reach the considered point.
If we move from the runway end and we place ourselves, for
instance, in x¼400 m, we have a probability of 0.025169 of having
a speed greater than zero in case of accident while, given that the
accident happened and reached this point, we will record a speed
depending from the distribution shown in Fig. 7.
We assigned a speed distribution to every “observation” point
beyond the runway end; later these will be able to combine with
the weight distribution characterizing the traffic of the airport
under analysis. In this study we considered a range of 1000 m, and
calculations were made for every 50 m for a total of 20 considered
points along the runway axis (Fig. 8).
It is worth noting that the trend of expected speed does not
evolve with distance from the runway end in a very intuitive way:
one would expect speed expected values to simply decrease as it
gets farther from the runway end. It is not so, at least for what
concerns landing overruns: in the first 1000 m the percentage of
“high speed” aircraft increases with the distance from runway end,
causing a positive trend to be recorded for average speeds.
Landing overrun expected speeds have a marked growing trend
in the first 700 m, then assuming an almost constant value that
decreases very rapidly after the 1000 m threshold.
Takeoff overruns as expected have higher mean speeds. Their
course decreases monotonously: a rapid decrease is visible in the
first hundred meters, followed by a relatively constant range
between 500 m and 1000 m where the average speed is comprised
between 80 km/h and 90 km/h; a sudden drop follows and the
function overlaps with the one referring to landing overruns.
A probability distribution describing the mass of aircrafts doing
landing or takeoff operations in the considered airport can be
easily built referring to historical records (in the present study
calculations were carried out separately for landing and takeoff,
due to the difference in the location models and mass distribu-
tions). By using Monte Carlo simulation, it is then possible to
combine speed values from probability distributions with mass
values, obtaining a probability distribution of kinetic energy values
for every location, given the accident. Fig. 9 shows the mean value
trend resulting from the Monte Carlo simulations.
A further application of the Monte Carlo technique allows the
combination of probability values of accidents specific to each location
(as given by the two-dimensional grid previously obtained) with
corresponding values from kinetic energy probability distributions.
The result is a two-dimensional grid, which can be superimposed on
the airport topological map, expressing for each area the expected
kinetic energy distribution due to overrun events, named Iso-Kinetic
Energy Areas (KEA expressed in [kJ/movement]).
7. Case study: Overrun risk analysis at Linate airport (Milan,
Italy)
7.1. Input data pre-processing
The complete procedure was applied to Enrico Forlanini Airport
(LIN), the second larger civil airport serving the Milan metropolitan
area after Malpensa.
To carry out the study, we used data referring to the year 2009.
Airport Traffic data was available from the database “Business
Objects” of SEA, the Milan airports management company. It
consisted in about 40,500 records, each one containing information
about a single operation, either an arrival or a departure, date of
the flights, aircraft model, national or international origin or
destination, user category (such as passenger, freighter, mail etc.),
aircraft dimensions and mass expressed by Maximum Takeoff
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Fig. 10. Crosswind intensity at the primary runway of Linate Airport (year 2009).
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Weight (MTOW), and the number of movements corresponding to
the description given by the previous columns.
Meteorological data was available thanks to the Ente Nazionale di
Assistenza al Volo (ENAV) as a collection of reports sampled every
thirty minutes. The reports come in METAR (METeorological Aero-
drome Report) format, one of the most popular formats in the world
for the transmission of weather data. It is highly standardized
through International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which
allows it to be understood throughout most of the globe. METAR
records consist on a row of letters and numbers grouped so as to
form codes. A typical METAR report contains data for temperature,
dew point, wind speed and direction, precipitation, cloud cover and
height, visibility, and barometric pressure. A METAR report may also
contain information on precipitation amounts, lightning, and other
information that would be of interest to pilots or meteorologists.
Based on the mentioned data sets, discrete probability distribu-
tions were built according to the observed frequency of levels for
each factor; these in turn have been used as inputs for the
comprehensive model, as previously explained.
Seasonality phenomena have been checked by means of Fried-
man test, for continuous and categorical data (such as “Temperature”
and “User Class” respectively), and of chi-square test, for Boolean
data (such as the presence of rain and thunderstorms). Due to the
high seasonality shown especially by weather-related data, the
procedure was executed separately for each season. Figs. 10 and 11
provide an outlook on some of the most relevant input data.
In the application of Monte Carlo method values corresponding to
the various factors are extracted depending on the correspondent
probability distributions; when the software user doesn’t specify any
relationship between them, the simulation goes on with the
Table 4
Pearson correlation coefficients associated to every combination of factors (second line reports the corresponding p-values).
Jet/Turbo Local/foreign Commer-cial/Cargo/GA MTOW T Fog Snow El. Storm Cross-wind Ceiling
Local/foreign 0.029
p 0
Commercial/Cargo/GA 0.184 0.023
p 0 0.003
Mtow 0.297 0.007 0.769
p 0 0.37 0
T 0.003 0.013 0.024 0.015
p 0.698 0.098 0.003 0.063
Fog 0.01 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.3
p 0.216 0.785 0.686 0.91 0
Snow 0.003 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.17 0.03
p 0.747 0.073 0.267 0.503 0 0
El. Storm 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.121 0.048 0.019
p 0.702 0.339 0.277 0.66 0 0 0.018
Crosswind 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.124 0.124 0.017 0.193
p 0.513 0.948 0.534 0.9 0 0 0.034 0
Ceiling 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.061 0.07 0.1 0.017 0.044
p 0.434 0.544 0.233 0.411 0 0 0 0.031 0
Visibility 0.005 0.007 0.04 0.022 0.548 0.519 0.174 0.055 0.077 0.236
p 0.531 0.353 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0
0-50 Years
50-100 Years
>100 Years
Fig. 12. Expected Return Time (expressed in years) grid for Landing overruns (for confidentiality reasons the grid does not represent the real topology).
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assumption that the above-mentioned factors are completely inde-
pendent from one another. In our case however it looked more than
likely that some of the factors values could influence the way in
which other values make their appearance; for instance, if a very low
temperature value is extracted the scenario is more likely to be
snowy than it would have been if an high temperature value
appeared. In order to keep these bounds into account, Pearson
correlation coefficients were determined for each combination of
factors; they can be seen for each pair of factors, reported in Table 4.
7.2. Analysis and topological reporting of results
In the following some of the most interesting results are reported
and briefly discussed. Nevertheless, due to the confidentiality and
proprietary nature of the data some references and details are omitted.
Results, which may be expressed in the form of two-dimensional
grids, include accident probability per movement, return time of an
overrun accident and expected aircraft kinetic energy per movement.
While the local values of different indicators depend on the resolu-
tion chosen for the grid, Figs. 12 and 13 give an overview on the
gradients followed by return times and expected kinetic energy,
respectively. High kinetic energy values per movement and short
expected times are assigned the color red: the decreasing level of
concern is clearly visible when increasing the distance between the
observation point and the runway end, and it was highlighted by
gradually shading toward green and blue, respectively.
The most critical points are obviously located right beyond the
runway end: in this location we obtained return times of the order
of ten years and expected kinetic energy values of 102 kJ/move-
ment. It is difficult to compare these results with recorded data in
order to assess the accuracy of the model, since such a short
excursion would not necessarily be considered an accident, thanks
also to the presence of the runway safety area, the data about such
minor occurrences might not have been always recorded.
A sensitivity analysis was also carried out: factors were controlled,
one by one, during multiple simulations, so that it was possible to
assess their degree of influence on accident probability. The tornado
graph is a particularly direct way to represent sensitivity results: it
shows the variation of the mean value of the accident probability that
1,00E-02
1,00E-03
1,00E-04
1,00E-05
<1,00E-06
Fig. 13. KEA severity index: expected kinetic energy distribution [kJ/movement] beyond runway end (for confidentiality reasons the grid does not represent the real
topology).
Fig. 14. Sensitivity tornado of the overrun mean probability during winter
landings.
Fig. 15. Sensitivity tornado of the overrun mean probability during winter takeoffs.
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a percentage variation of every factor is able to induce. Tornado graphs
in Figs. 14 and 15 refer to landings and takeoff overrun probabilities
respectively, and have been calculated using winter data (the worst
scenario). Weather-related data are clearly the most influential factors;
the presence of icing conditions, snow and crosswind are the factors
which most contribute in increasing accident probability. The only
significant traffic-related factor is equipment class, which is however
influential during takeoff operations only.
8. Conclusions and possible further developments
While previous models gave single probability values as output,
the proposed two-steps procedure returns probability and severity
results in the form of a topological grid, thus characterising the
terrain surrounding the runway and therefore giving the possibility
to compare them with the underlying infrastructure. Results are
available in several forms, starting from the simple probability
distribution of each area to be hit by an overrun, to the expected
kinetic energy received in case of accident or the combination of
both into a risk index.
The method proposed is a more systematic approach to quan-
tify risk levels at individual runway ends, which form the basis for
determining appropriate ASA dimensions. The proposed technique
also has the advantage of being relatively transparent and more
independent from qualitative judgements that are predominant
even in modern cost benefit evaluation of safety programs [19].
From a meteorological point of view the model allows a detailed
characterisation, not only of the area surrounding the airport but
also of the chosen runway where the analysis is being conducted:
in fact, in large airports, some meteorological or topological factors,
such as crosswind speed or type of terrain, may differ from one
runway to another. The model also takes into consideration the
type of traffic the runway is subject to: aircraft movements are
assigned a weight class, propulsion type, user class and type of
origin or destination, discriminated between local and foreign. A
further characterization of the airport involves the possible pre-
sence of significant terrain in its proximities and the distinction
between hub or non hub, depending on traffic amount. All this
information is able to describe the airport traffic and environment
in an extremely detailed way over any chosen period.
Results provided by the proposed procedure are primarily rele-
vant for safety management, land planning and structural analysis of
airport facilities. However, airline companies might also benefit from
such a way of studying and characterising their points of departure
and destination in terms of overrun risks; indeed, also airline
companies have some options at hand to mitigate overrun risks, e.
g. by an advanced planning of fleet and crews according to the
seasonal variation of risk exposure at different departure and
destination airports.
A summary of the implications of the study for runway design
or operation is listed below:
– The method allows a better quantification of the probability of
accidents for each topological area of the airport allowing a
more detailed planning of Airport Safety Areas (ASA). The ICAO
may have implicitly considered in its safety regulations for
airport operations however as already mentioned the recom-
mendations provided in Annex 14 are only able to give very
broad directions, while the current method allows an explicit
quantification of the diverse influences of risk and facilitates the
assessment of expected accident frequencies and expected
kinetic energy in different locations. ASA dimensional needs
could therefore be adjusted with consideration for both criteria.
– The present study also offers some relevant insight on the
dynamics of overrun events and the effects in terms of expected
consequences from the airport layout point of view, as it
demonstrated that, despite the rapid decrease of the probability
that an aircraft will overrun a long distance, the expected speed
during a runway excursion remains almost constant for about
1000 m beyond the runway end (as per the results visualized in
Figs. 8 and 9); the same is valid for the associated kinetic energy
of the aircraft. This result therefore is to be used to test the need
to design physical protective measures and better layouts in
modern airports.
– Further development of the models may also allow taking into
account the possibility of comparing different methods to absorb
the expected kinetic energies of overruns so as to minimize
damage.
The proposed approach and procedure still suffers from some
limitations; directions for further improvements clearly emerged
during their development and first implementation; they also
correspond to areas of ongoing research:
– continuous improvement of probability and location models to
include a wider spectrum of influencing factors, particularly the
available excess runway [20];
– also the deceleration model, proposed by Kirkland et al. [10]
and adopted in the proposed PRA procedure, could be enhanced
to remove the limits of a linear approximation and to account
for a wider set of terrain and obstacle types;
– the consequence model could also be enlarged and improved
[20], to integrate some basic vulnerability assessment methods
of infrastructure and buildings and also to enable the assess-
ment of more complex accident scenarios (e.g. an overrun event
ending with fire or explosion).
– Finally the model currently proposed is based on modules that
have already been statistically validated by comparing the results
of the regressions with the actual statistical accident data
collected [1]. However, a further validation of the results obtained
by the study (especially in relation to the kinetic energy element)
could be obtained if data from Advanced Surface Movement
Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) [21] could be stored
and used for this purpose.
Further developments of this kind are to be negotiated with the
airport authorities and if successful, there is considerable scope to
develop more extensive case studies.
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